Abstract-In this paper the open-loop zero-sum linear quadratic differential game for descriptor systems that have index one will be studied for a finite and infinite planning horizon. Both necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of an open loop Nash equilibrium will be considered.
INTRODUCTION
A linear quadratic differential game is a mathematical model that represents a conflict between different agents which control a dynamical system and each of them is trying to minimize his individual quadratic objective function by giving a control to the system. For this purpose, linear quadratic differential games have been applied in many different fields such as economic competitions among companies, environmental management games, armed conflicts, and parlor games [1] .
Although the game has been applied in many fields, however, not all systems can be represented by an ordinary differential game. Descriptor systems can be used to model more complex systems and provide the ability to model more accurately the structure of physical systems, including non dynamic modes and impulsive modes [2] , [3] . This paper is the continuation of the work of [4] where the general linear quadratic differential game is considered for descriptor systems of index one. In this paper we elaborate the special important case when the game is zero-sum. We will show that under this extra simplitying condition it is possible to derive more explicit necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of an open-loop Nash equilibrium both for a finite planning horizon and infinite planning horizon. We assume that the players act non-cooperatively and the only information they have is the present state and the model structure [2] . This paper is going to be organized as follows; section II will include some basic results of linear quadratic differential games for descriptor systems and also state the main purpose 978-1-4577-1460-3/11/$26.00 ©2011 IEEE
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Mathematics Department UGM Y ogyakarta, Indonesia of this paper. Section III will present the main result for the zero-sum game on a finite planning horizon while Section IV will deal with an infinite planning horizon. Section V will illustrate in an example some results from the previous sections. At last, section VI will conclude.
II.
PRELIMINARIES
The game considered in this paper is a game described by the dynamical system
we re , E ,r an
Ui E R m i are the actions player i can use to control the system and Xo is the initial state. Each player has a quadratic cost functional Ji given by
We start this section by stating some required basic results [4] . First, we recall some results [5] concerning the differential algebraic equation 
where J is a matrix in Jordan form whose elements are the finite eigenvalues, I k E R k x k is the identity matrix and N is a nilpotent matrix also in Jordan form. J and N are unique up to permutation of Jordan blocks.
If (4) is regular, then the solutions of (3) take the form [4] , [6] x(t) = X I x I (t) + X2x2 (t)
where with y =[y { X y; T R ( n+ r )xn X y; T R ( n+ r )xn d I , I E , 2, 2 E ,a n
under the consistency condition: If E is nonsingular, we define the index to be zero.
Further, we assume that the degree of nilpotency of N is not more than one. Let Finally, we define our main object of study in this paper, the open-loop Nash equilibrium [4] , [8] .
Definition I. Assume (I) is regular and has index one. Let Xo be a consistent initial state and U denote the set of bounded piecewise 978-1-4577-1460-3/11/$26.00 ©2011 IEEE continuous functions. Then (u;, u;) E U is an open-loop Nash (OLN) equilibrium if for every ( ul ,u; ), ( u; ,u2 ) E U , JI ( u; ,u; ) � J1 ( ul ,u;) and J 2 ( u; , u; ) � J 2 ( u; , u2 ) .
III. THE FINITE PLANNING HORIZON
In this section we consider the game (I) and (2) under the assumption that t j is finite. Furthermore, to avoid the inclusion of controls in the scrap value, we make the standard assumption as in [4] and [9] 
It has been shown in [4] that with the result from Theorem 1, the game (I) and (2) 
With cost functional Ji for the player i given by (6) 1 {zT (t) Mi Z(t)}dt +xT (tj ) Qit j X I (tj)' (7) where zT (t)=[xT (t) u T (t) uI (t)] and
The spellings of the matrices defined in (8) and other additional notation that will be used throughout this paper are presented in the Appendix.
Next, we recall from [4] the next result for the nonzero sum linear quadratic differential game for descriptor systems (see also [8] for the ordinary differential game). Theorem 2. A. Assume that i. The Riccati differential equation
has a solution P on [0, t j ] ' and 11. The two Riccati differential equations 15-17 November 2011, Bandung, Indonesia
Then the differential game (1) and (2) has a unique OLN equilibrium for every consistent initial state. Moreover, the equilibrium actions are
u2 (t) where <l> (t, 0) is the solution of the transition equation
The corresponding state trajectory is given by
For all t f E [0, td there exist for all consistent X o a unique OLN equilibrium for game (1) and (2) Consider the differential game described by (1), with for the player one, the quadratic cost function:
= t t {zT (t)Mz(t)} dt +x{ (tf ) Qt j x I (tf)
where if = r� :1 :
And, for player two, the opposite objective function J 2 ( ul, u2 ) = -J l ( ul, u2 ) , where the matrices Q, Qt and Ri, i = 1, 2 are symmetric. 
has a symmetric solution P ( 0, t f ) for all t f E [0, t l ) . 
The Riccati differential equations
K l (t) = -f Kdt)-Kdt)J +( K l (t) Y i � + Tj )Ri] l x( BTJ{Kdt) + Tj T)_ Q; KdT)=Qt j K2 (t) = _JT K2 (t)-K2 (t)J + (K2 (t) J]B2 + v2) R2i X (B1Y i TK2 (t) +vJ)+Q ; K2(T)= -Qt j have a solution Ki (-) on [0, t f ], i = 1, 2.
(t ) : = (li + P2 ) (t) P (t)=fp(t)-P (t)(J -BG-I Z d +p(t)BG-l
B2 J] P2 (t) , P(tf)=O. Obviously P (t) = ° satisfies this differential equation. Since the solution to this differential equation is unique we conclude that li (t) = -P2 (t) . Substitution of this into equation (9) again, yields:
After some elementary manipulations we get then the differential equation (15) with p(t) = : 11 (t). The symmetry of P ( 0, t f ) foIIows from the symmetry of Qt f and the symmetry of the differential equation (15) (see [8] ). The corresponding equilibrium strategies are then directly obtained from Theorem 2.
IV. THE INFINITE PLANNING HORIZON
As in [4] , in this section we assume that the cost functional player i = 1, 2 , likes to minimize is :
where subject to (1).
We start by recaIIing some important notions concerning algebraic Riccati equations that play a main role in the rest of this paper [4] , [8] .
Definition 2.
A solution P E R 2 n x n of the algebraic Riccati equation Consider the differential game described by (1) with, for player one, the quadratic cost functional : In the case that matrix J is stable, then the condition under which the zero-sum game has an OLN equilibrium can be further simplified. This is shown in the following theorem, while the proof of this theorem is in line with the proof in [8] .
Consider the open-loop zero-sum differential game as described in Theorem 5. Assume, additionally, that matrix J is stable. Then, the game has for every initial state a unique OLN equilibrium if and only if the next two conditions hold.
The algebraic Riccati equation
o=-JT p-p]+PBCrIBT P-Q,
978-1-4577-1460-3/11/$26.00 ©2011 IEEE has a symmetric solution P such that J -BG-I (Z + j jTp) is stable. (29) Moreover, the corresponding unique equilibrium actions are
The two algebraic Riccati equations
The cost for player one is and for player two is -J I . The symmetric and uniqueness properties of P follow immediately from the fact that P is stabilizing solution of an ordinary Riccati equation (see [8] ).
V. AN EXAMPLE
Consider the game defined by the system
and cost function 
Furthermore, after some calculations, matrix M results as This paper studies the linear quadratic zero-sum differential game for descriptor systems which have index one. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of an OLN equilibrium have been derived. The paper shows how the solution of the game depends on a Riccati differential equation for the finite horizon case and an algebraic Riccati equation for the infinite horizon. A numerical example illustrating some of the theoretical results is presented.
The problem addressed in this paper is restricted to index one descriptor systems. To find an OLN equilibrium in a zero sum game that has higher order index is still an open problem to be analyzed. 
